Open-mindedness involves a readiness to give due consideration to relevant evidence and argument, especially when factors present in the situation tempt one to resist such consideration, with a view to increasing our awareness, understanding and appreciation, avoiding error, and reaching true and defensible conclusions. It means being critically receptive to alternative possibilities and new ideas, resisting inflexible and dogmatic attitudes, and sincerely trying to avoid whatever might suppress or distort our reflections.
Open-mindedness is relevant to whatever views we presently hold in the sense that we remain committed to reconsidering them in the light of new questions, doubts, and findings; and it also involves maintaining a certain outlook throughout the entire process of inquiry, whereby we remain willing to accept whatever view proves in the end to have the strongest evidential and reasoned support.
No sooner had philosophy developed into a distinctive form of inquiry in classical times than the attitude of open-mindedness emerged as central to serious philosophical inquiry.
To be willing to take relevant evidence and argument into account in reaching our beliefs, even if the conclusion runs counter to what we might wish to be the case or contradicts what we presently believe, is the very attitude implicit in the Socratic ideal of following the argument where it leads. We are to "follow the argument" by refusing to rest content with our present assumptions, however certain they may appear, if further consideration seems warranted; and also by accepting whatever findings result from such inquiry and reflection even if those results are quite unwelcome.
These twin aspects of the ideal reverberate throughout the history of philosophy. Echoes of the Socratic view are heard, for example, in Peirce's warning against holding that a law or truth has found its last and perfect formulation, and against allowing a preferred conclusion to draw one into sham reasoning. Similarly, Russell maintains that opinions should be held with a consciousness that new evidence may lead to their abandonment, and he reminds us that our own desires, tastes, and interests must not be thought to provide a key to understanding the world. To follow the argument is to recognize that our views have a tentative and provisional character, and that any further inquiry into these or other ideas must not be forestalled, constrained or shaped by preconceived ideas and wishful thinking.
From its appearance as an intellectual virtue in ancient philosophy, open-mindedness gradually came to be thought of as an ideal for every form of inquiry, and finally emerged in the early twentieth century as a central aim of general education itself as inquiry methods of teaching and learning began to replace authoritarian imposition. Mill anticipated these developments in the middle of the nineteenth century by calling for a kind of teaching that would be characterized by an inquiring, not a dogmatic spirit; but it was primarily as a result of Dewey's influential conception of education as a continuous A related concern is that open-mindedness involves an inability to adopt and maintain a firm belief. Many philosophers, in fact, take the view that open-mindedness precludes firm belief, and this immediately makes the attitude problematic because firm belief is evidently important in many contexts. Open-mindedness, as a result, inevitably seems to be of doubtful value. Philosophers remind us that we cannot be forever changing our stance, since this would mean that we would abandon a view before there had been time to properly explore and test it. Good ideas would be abandoned before they were given adequate attention or even properly understood; and discoveries that eventually result from researchers sticking doggedly to a line of inquiry despite early, unpromising findings would be lost. A readiness to embrace new ideas seems to undermine appropriate tenaciousness with respect to existing beliefs. only that they will need to be revised or rejected if they are found wanting; our present beliefs may be such that we are fully convinced of their truth, but we remain openminded because we are aware of our own general fallibility with respect to our convictions; (iii) open-mindedness does not oblige us to abandon a line of inquiry in order to pursue some alternative possibility because the value of that alternative does not necessarily outweigh the value of our present inquiry, and we may often judge (with little effort) that the cost of abandoning the work we are engaged on is too great; (iv) the everpresent danger that various factors may undermine our efforts at open-minded inquiry does not show that such attempts never succeed, at least to some degree; indeed the fact that we can point out examples where bias, unexamined assumptions, and a host of other factors distorted our earlier inquiries is itself an indication of some success; (v Armstrong observes that "there are some people that if they don't know, you can't tell them." They cannot be told because they don't want to know, because they think they already know, because they can't believe that they wouldn't know (if anyone does), or because what they do know prevents them from adding to or modifying their knowledge.
The fact that they can't be told is an indication of their closed-mindedness; it reveals their unwillingness to consider the possibility that something other than what they presently believe might be true. In an open-minded classroom, students may be able to practice the critical skills of inquiry that will enable them to become independent thinkers.
8. It matters because it is the attitude that enables us to continue to view a desired outcome as possible when its achievement seems all but impossible. It allows us to contemplate some state of affairs as an alternative to the present situation when there is a strong temptation to view the status quo as permanent. Vaklav Havel speaks of the way in which people in the former Czechoslovakia "had all become used to the totalitarian system and accepted it as an unalterable fact of life." 3 A few people, of course, kept the dream alive, and managed to resist the seductive "voice of reason" that argued for acquiescence. Havel draws the conclusion that "everything seems to indicate that we must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality." 
